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Social License and Publicness 
 Hillary A. Sale1 
 
Abstract. 
 
This article deploys the sociological theory of social license, or the 
acceptance of a business or organization by the relevant 
communities and stakeholders, in the context of the board of 
directors and corporate governance. Corporations are generally 
regulated and treated as “private” actors, and corporate law falls into 
the zone of “private” law. The construct of the corporation as 
“private” allows for considerable latitude. Yet, corporate decision 
makers are the beneficiaries of economic and political power and, 
the decisions they make have impacts that extend well beyond the 
boundaries of the entities they represent. Using Wells Fargo and 
Uber as case studies, this article explores, how the failure to account 
for the public nature of corporate actions, regardless of whether 
“legal” license exists, can result in the loss of “social” license through 
publicness, or the interplay between inside corporate governance 
players and the outside actors who report on, recapitulate, reframe 
and, in some cases, control the company’s information and public 
perception. The theory of social license is that businesses (and other 
entities) exist with permission from the communities in which they 
are located, as well as with permission from larger communities and 
stakeholders. In this sense, businesses are social, not just economic, 
institutions and, thus, they are subject to public accountability and, 
at times, public control. Social license derives not from legally-
granted permission, but instead from the development of legitimacy, 
credibility, and trust within the relevant communities and 
stakeholders. It can prevent demonstrations, boycotts, shut downs, 
negative publicity, and the increases in regulation that are a hallmark 
of publicness – but it must be earned with consistent trustworthy 
behavior and is bilateral, not unilateral. As a result, the company’s 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks go to Olivia Brown and 
Samantha Glazer at Georgetown and Kelsey Bolin and Colin Pajda from Washington 
University for their invaluable research assistance, and to Brian Tamanaha, Bob Thompson, 
Don Langevoort, Michael Diamond, Urska Velikonja, Saul Levmore, David Hyman, Bob 
Rasmussen, Cynthia Williams, Bill Buzbee, and the Georgetown and Michigan Law Faculties. 
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social license can be a tool for risk management in particular and 
managing publicness more generally.  
 
By developing and deploying social license and publicness in the 
context of board decision-making, this article adds to the discussions 
in the literature from other disciplines, like for example the economic 
theory on reputational capital, and provides boards with a set of 
standards with which to engage and to help address the publicness of 
the companies they represent. Thus, social license can become part 
of proactive cost benefit decision making. As a result, discussing, 
weighing, and developing social license is not just in the zone of what 
boards can do, but is something that they should do. Indeed, the 
failure to do so can have dramatic business consequences. 
 
Introduction. 
 
On January 16, 2019, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock investment 
management company, one of the largest institutional shareholders, 
released a letter addressed to the CEOs of public companies.2 In that 
letter, Fink points out how society and shareholders alike are making 
increasing demands of companies, asking them to respond to broad 
societal changes.3 
 
“Stakeholders are pushing companies to wade into sensitive social 
and political issues – especially as they see governments failing to 
do so effectively. As CEOs, we don’t always get it right. And what is 
appropriate for one company may not be for another. One thing, 
however, is certain: the world needs your leadership. As divisions 
continue to deepen, companies must demonstrate their 
commitment to the countries, regions, and communities where 
they operate, particularly on issues central to the world’s future 
prosperity.”4 
 
                                                 
2 Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: Purpose and Profit,BLACKROCK (Jan. 16, 2019) 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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Fink presses CEOs to take leadership on various issues and to focus 
not only on shareholders, but also to consider the impact of their 
companies on all of their stakeholders. On January 12, 2018, Fink 
issued a letter with similar themes.5 In that letter, he also argued that 
boards should, as a matter of company strategy explore their impact 
on and interaction with all stakeholders, including “shareholders, 
employees, customers, and the communities in which they 
operate.”6 Further, Fink stated that corporate governance modes 
must be developed that allow boards (and not just CEOs) to better 
direct and oversee the long-term strategies of their companies.7 To 
this end, Fink instructs boards to ask themselves the following 
questions about their companies: 
 
“What role do we play in the community? How are we 
managing our impact on the environment? Are we working to 
create a diverse workforce? Are we adapting to technological 
change? Are we providing the retraining and opportunities 
that our employees and our business will need to adjust to an 
increasingly automated world? Are we using behavioral 
finance and other tools to prepare workers for retirement so 
that they invest in a way that will help them achieve their 
goals?”8 
 
These exhortations, coming from the leader of one of the world’s 
largest institutional investors and investment companies, represents 
a stark shift from the traditional shareholder primacy theory or the 
idea that shareholder value is the exclusive objective of corporations. 
Indeed, the BlackRock letters demand that boards alter their 
corporate governance strategy to effectively anticipate and address a 
wide variety of stakeholder concerns – arguing that those who do not 
will lose their license to operate – a term that arises out of the 
sociological literature.  
 
                                                 
5 Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose BLACKROCK (Jan. 12, 2018) 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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How are boards to implement such a significant change to their 
traditional governance and business concerns? And, how might such 
a change improve long-term corporate value? This article suggests 
that boards can adapt and deploy the social license theory as an 
effective tool to implement stakeholder-based corporate governance 
practices that are good for shareholders and stakeholders alike. In 
combination with publicness, the social license theory provides 
boards with an approach to understanding its three key roles 
(strategy, risk, and people) and undertaking them with a deeper 
understanding of the company’s relationship with and role in society 
and the outside pressures that can derail even the most well-
developed strategies and goals. 
 
This article explores the construct of social license, or the acceptance 
of a business or organization by the relevant communities and 
stakeholders, in the context of the board of directors and corporate 
governance. Corporations are generally regulated and treated as 
“private” actors, and corporate law falls into the zone of “private” 
law.9 The board is at the fulcrum of the corporate entity. It is charged 
with managing governance and overseeing management, and the 
private status of corporate entities provides considerable latitude for 
director decision making. Yet, time and time again, companies fail to 
account for the public nature of their actions, including those for 
which they otherwise have legal permission or legal license.10 Social 
license theory, prominent in sociological studies of community and 
business relations, provides a powerful construct both for scholars 
examining corporate actions and for boards to consider when 
developing business strategies and weighing risk. It adds to the 
discussions in the literature from other disciplines, like for example 
the economic theory on reputational capital, and provides boards 
with a set of standards with which to engage and to help address the 
publicness of the companies they represent. Indeed, social license 
can become part of proactive cost benefit decision making. As a 
result, discussing, weighing, and developing social license is not just 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2014). 
10 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 913 (2005) (arguing  one reason for these continued failures is that "the evolution 
of governance arrangements--which are in part designed to constrain and regulate 
management--has been for too long left to a process controlled by management”). 
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in the zone of what boards can do, but is something that they should 
do. Indeed, the failure to do so can have dramatic business 
consequences. 
 
Social license and publicness, a theory about which I and other 
corporate scholars have previously written, are connected.11 
Publicness is the interplay between inside corporate governance 
players and the outside actors who report on, recapitulate, reframe 
and, in some cases, control the company’s information and public 
perception.12 Corporate decision makers are the beneficiaries of 
considerable economic and political power and, consequently, the 
decisions they make have impacts that extend well beyond the 
boundaries of the entities they represent. These outside 
constituencies include the media and the general public. Although 
the freedom corporate actors enjoy is already subject to laws and 
regulations, publicness, too, creates limits on the powers of those 
actors -- but not necessarily through court decisions, legislation, or 
regulation. In this manner, publicness concerns the space above the 
legally-licensed line and the zone of the license to operate. 
 
Social license also occupies this space. The theory of social license is 
that businesses (and other entities) exist with permission from the 
communities in which they are located, as well as with permission 
from larger communities and stakeholders. In this sense, businesses 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and 
Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH.  U.L. REV. 487 (2015); Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An 
Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale, Public 
Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, 
Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
1573 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Joan MacLeod Hemingway, 
Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 
477 (2014); Joan M. Heminway & Shelden R. Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding 
and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: 
Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2015); Cary M. Shelby, 
Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV. 
405 (2016). 
12 See Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 14 at 1630 (“[O]utside parties do more than listen; they 
reframe and often critique the stories, in ways that may force corporations to alter their 
preferred governance structure--regardless of their legal status as private or public.”); see 
also Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14 at 1013-14; Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 
supra note 14 at 141. 
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are social, not just economic, institutions and, thus, they are subject 
to public accountability and, at times, public control.13 Even if not 
explicit, businesses require both legal license and social license to 
operate. Thus, social license derives not from legally-granted 
permission, but instead from the development of legitimacy, 
credibility, and trust within the relevant communities and 
stakeholders. It can prevent demonstrations, boycotts, shut downs, 
negative publicity, and the increases in regulation that are a hallmark 
of publicness.14 As a result, the company’s social license can be a tool 
for risk management in particular and managing publicness more 
generally.15 Importantly, unlike legal licenses which can be applied 
and paid for, social license, or the license to operate, must be earned 
with consistent, trustworthy behavior, along with solutions and 
compromises achieved through dialogue with relevant sectors of the 
community.16 In this sense, social license is bilateral, not unilateral, 
thus both differing considerably from legal license and connecting to 
the process and substance of publicness. 
 
                                                 
13 Domènec Melé & Jaume Armengou, Moral Legitimacy in Controversial Projects and Its 
Relationship with Social License to Operate: A Case Study, 136 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 729 (2016). 
See also Jeffrey Bone, Legal Perspective on Corporate Responsibility: Contractarian or 
Communitarian Thought, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 277, 288 (2011) (noting that 
corporations possess a social contract with their constituents and societal stakeholders). 
14 Phillipe Hanna, Frank Vanclay, Esther J. Langdon, & Jos Arts, Conceptualizing Social Protest 
and the Significance of Protest Action to Large Projects, EXTRACTIVE INDUST. & SOC. 3, 217, 217-
19 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.10.006. Front end regulation, of course, has 
its costs. It can dampen the entrepreneurial spirit. Social license, in contrast, is not formal 
regulation. It is self-regulation, and long-run focused. 
15 Robert G. Boutilier, Leeora Black, & Ian Thomson, From Metaphor to Management Tool: 
How the Social License to Operate can Stabilise the Socio-political Environment for Business, 
INT’L MINE MGMT. 2012 PROCEEDINGS, 227-237 (2012). See also Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. 
Williams, & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. 
L. 325, 344 (2008) (detailing how corporations increasingly turn to third-party assurance 
networks as a tool for managing social, environmental, and governance risks). However, 
proponents of social license view it as more than simple risk management. It is just as much 
about joint understanding. See Robert G. Boutilier & Ian Thomson, Modelling and Measuring 
the Social License to Operate: Fruits of a Dialogue Between Theory and Practice, 
SOCIALICENSE.COM (2011), 
https://socialicense.com/publications/Modelling%20and%20Measuring%20the%20SLO.pdf;Geer
t Demuijnck & Bjorn Fasterling, The Social License to Operate, 136 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 680-81 
(2016). 
16 Geert Demuijnck & Bjorn Fasterling, supra note 18 at 675. See also Dirk Matten et. al., 
Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of Corporate Citizenship, 45 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 109, 
110 (2003). 
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This Article deploys publicness and social license together, analyzing 
them and developing the theory of social license in the context of, 
and as a tool for, engaged director decision making. Both publicness 
and social license are implicated when the pressure for changes in 
the decision-making structure and the allocation of power within a 
corporation comes from “outsiders.” When outsiders effectively 
make themselves part of the governance dialogue, publicness is at 
work. In some cases, decision-making transfers from officers and 
directors, with some input from shareholders, to stakeholders and 
others.17 Much of this shift occurs through the publicness process 
explored below and, as this article argues, can be managed with an 
effective social license. Interestingly, in this sense, social license 
occupies space that corporate law and fiduciary duties purport to 
control.18 
 
Today, publicness grows through a public-private dialectic that 
derives, at least in part, from the ease and availability of media. 
Scrutiny is 24/7, and the failure of corporate actors to understand 
this dynamic results in costly challenges and failures. Further, when 
situations erupt, the existing level of corporate publicness can 
multiply due to the way in which outsiders and the media create 
feedback loops. The financial crisis, about which I and many others 
have written, reveals this aspect of publicness.19 Consider, for 
example, how the reactions of citizens to the financial crisis produced 
                                                 
17 For perspectives on the relationship between corporations, stakeholders, and 
communities, see Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932); William Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 266-67 (1992); Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory 
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Bone, supra note 16; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and 
the Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129, 131 (2009); Bryan Horrigan, Fault Lines in the 
Intersection Between Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, 25 U.N.S.W.L.J. 515 
(2002); MICHAEL DIAMOND & LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS, A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: 
CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A COURSE IN CORPORATE LAW, 652-55 (2004) (describing “other 
constituency” statues that allow boards of directors to take the interests of named 
constituencies, such as labor or local communities, into account when making corporate 
decisions). 
18 A successful social license engenders both internal and external corporate trust, for 
example. Trust is an essential component of corporate law that is, arguably, not effectively 
managed by current corporate fiduciary doctrine. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and 
Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L. J. 425 (1993). 
19 See Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14 at 1013-14; Sale, The New “Public” 
Corporation, supra note 14 at 141; John C. Coffee, Jr., & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: 
Does the Treasury Have A Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009). 
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demands for accountability and resulted in the Dodd-Frank Act and 
increased government intervention and regulation.20 
 
Publicness in the corporate governance structure also develops as 
companies make choices, including those about risks and risk 
taking.21 The company’s risk choices, and its management of them, 
impacts not just the traditional governance participants - 
shareholders, officers, and directors - but also community 
stakeholders and the public.22 Risk failures can be costly – and not 
just for the company. In the wake of risks gone bad, employees lose 
their jobs, local communities suffer, and people even lose their 
lives.23 The result for corporations is increased scrutiny and pressure, 
as well as, when outcomes are particularly bad, new laws and 
regulations.24 Examples abound. Consider BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico or the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Social license was lost in 
these situations, and, as this article argues, had the decision makers 
been more focused on social license and its importance to the 
growth and sustainability of their businesses, they may well have 
made different choices in the initial stages that would have 
prevented or diminished the outcomes of publicness. 
 
Part I of this Article examines the concept of publicness in greater 
detail, developing its substantive and procedural aspects. Part II then 
illustrates the role publicness played in the recent corporate scandals 
of Wells Fargo and Uber. Part III focuses on the various stages of 
social license theory, drawing on examples from companies that 
actively engaged in creating and maintaining social license as a tool 
for ensuring sustainable business growth. Finally, Part IV reevaluates 
the Wells Fargo and Uber scandals by applying social license theory 
to analyze how the companies failed to earn social licenses, assess 
                                                 
20 See Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14 at 1027 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act was 
“borne out of the corporate failure to self-govern” and “the public's desire for a quid pro quo or 
retribution”). 
21 See, e.g., Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 14. 
22 See, e.g., Horrigan, supra note 20.  
23 Sabrina Tavernise, Report Faults Mine Owner for Explosion that Killed 29, N.Y. TIMES (May 
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20mine.html?mcubz=0. 
24 CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers 
their Day in Court, CFPB NEWSROOM (May 5, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- 
us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory- 
arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-day-court/. 
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the impact of that failure on their respective scandals, and explore 
what they can do to build social licenses. The result is a deep dive 
into the sociological literature for the purpose of developing the role 
of the board and the understanding of corporate governance theory 
more broadly. 
 
I. Publicness and Corporate Governance. 
 
This part of the article provides a detailed examination of publicness. 
The theory of publicness has both substantive and procedural 
aspects.25 Substantively, publicness concerns the permissive nature 
of firms. Companies devolve from the public. Their “private” status is 
the result of legislative grants and is thus permissive.26 Therefore, 
corporations are creatures of the state, and it is this government-
granted power that gives them legal legitimacy, limited liability, and 
the opportunity to expand and grow.27 Indeed, historically, corporate 
entities were granted status on a case-by-case basis.28 Early entities 
granted this status were often quasi-public in nature, like public 
transit and other authorities today. Moreover, the potential and 
actual impact of corporate entities has long been a subject of 
discussion and concern, with, for example, the role of banks with 
respect to the money supply and on the economy receiving particular 
scrutiny.29 
 
                                                 
25 Of course substance and procedure, as distinctions in the law, are easily collapsed. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, I use the distinction to help delineate the types 
of publicness boards face. 
26 James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 8 
(2015); Bone, supra note 16 at 279-84. See also Jean L. Cohen & Andrew Arato, CIV. SOC’Y & 
POL. THEORY 352 (1992) (“[T]he private . . . ‘spheres’ have always been constituted and 
regulated by law, even if what is constituted includes a domain of autonomous judgment 
that can come into conflict with law.”). 
27 Indeed, publicness, as “derived from political authority, affects virtually every 
organization.” BARRY BOZEMAN, ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PUBLIC: BRIDGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 13 (1987). 
28 Robert B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law Arises: Delaware’s Golden Age and Likely 
Changes in the 21st Century, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING 
UP? (William Savitt, Steven D. Solomon & Randall Thomas eds., Univ. of Chi. Press, 
forthcoming 2019); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Independence?,(Id.) Bone, supra note 16 at 
279-84. See generally Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 
1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888). 
29 Thompson, supra note 31. 
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Thus, even though entities are allowed to incorporate and operate 
with considerable degrees of freedom, that freedom is permissive 
and, it turns out, easily circumscribed.30 Why? Because corporate 
entities wield economic and political power.31 Their decisions and 
choices impact employees and communities, and, in the case of 
something like the financial crisis, the economy and citizens much 
more broadly. And this is the zone of social license – the zone that 
BlackRock wants boards to give more space in their governance 
decisions. Demands for accountability are the natural and instinctive 
response to this accumulation of power, and the simplest forms of 
accountability come through regulation and constraints on private 
ordering.32 Thus, the public, through the legislature and other 
officials, constrains corporate choices ex ante through laws and 
regulations a form of substantive publicness. 
 
Substantive publicness also exists in the form of ex post 
enforcement. This enforcement, via investigations and litigation, 
occurs when companies violate public norms.33 The most recent 
example is the Dodd-Frank Act and the multiple investigations and 
                                                 
30 Indeed, the “private” status of corporations is in fact a construct. Cf. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING  
ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 277 (1990) (exploring similar issues in 
the context of family law and stating that “[t]racing the presence of state power in the family 
sphere, historically described as removed from the state, suggests something powerful 
about boundaries: both sides of a boundary are regulated, even if the line was supposed to 
distinguish the regulated from the unregulated.”). 
31 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK 18 (2016). See also Ian B. Lee, Citizenship 
and the Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129, 131 (2009); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY, pt. IV (1932) (developing arguments 
related to the power of corporations and the economy). 
32 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U.L. REV. (2003); Barak D. Richman, 
Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 389, 430 (2003). See also Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14 at 1013-14; Sale, The 
New “Public” Corporation, supra note 14 at 141; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 
904 (2003) (noting that government governance grows in response to scandals, and 
incrementally over time). 
33 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self- 
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How 
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?," 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997). See generally John C. 
Coffee Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 198 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 (working paper); John C. Coffee, 
The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic 
Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019; Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14 at 1013-14 ; 
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 14 at 141; Thompson & Sale, supra note 35. 
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enforcement actions against banks in the wake of the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. Prior to that, a wave of enforcement grew out of the 
Enron and Worldcom scandals and from the options backdating 
scandal and the dot-com crash.34 More recently, Wells Fargo and 
Uber have also experienced their share of substantive publicness. 
 
Interestingly, ex post enforcement is both public and private. Class 
actions are a key example of “private” litigation that supplements the 
public enforcement system. Resources at the federal and state levels 
are constrained. Thus, in the context of securities litigation (and, 
arguably, state fiduciary duty claims), courts have regularly asserted 
that private litigation is important to preserving market integrity and 
supplementing the government’s enforcement reach.35 
 
Publicness is also a process and that process, in turn, results in 
changes to substantive publicness. Our understanding of the 
substantive aspect of publicness, which highlights the publicly 
permissive nature of private ordering, develops over time. Why? 
Because the forces that drive it metamorphose, thus changing the 
process of publicness itself. Media, for example, is currently an 
important component of the process of publicness. Media coverage 
allows members of the public to participate in a dialogue about 
corporate actions and choices. That dialogue, in turn, plays a role in 
how the government makes enforcement and regulatory changes. 
Directors who fail to understand the power of the news media and 
the growth of social media are neglecting their role. For example, in 
response to crises, media coverage, and public pressure, government 
has increased its role in developing and supporting substantive 
                                                 
34 See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State 
Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 965 (2003) (“The SEC took several 
actions in the wake of the Enron scandal and related reports of corporate misdeeds. The 
WorldCom fiasco helped propel Congress toward legislation and within a month, the 
President had signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”); see also Langevoort & Thompson, 
supra note 14 at 374 (stating that “nearly all the examples of the melding of investor and 
broader social interests that have changed the meaning of publicness are reactions to highly 
salient (usually scandalous) events involving large public companies”). 
35 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 
804 (2011); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. CT. 2398 (2014). See also Sale & Thompson, supra note 14; 
Hillary Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure, and 
Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L. J. 763 (2016). 
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publicness.36 Regulatory surges are an inevitable response to 
widespread crises,37 but as the Wells Fargo and Uber situations 
reveal, even an individualized scandal can invoke the publicness 
process. The role that media and its accessibility (through blogs and 
comments on news articles, for example) plays, now accelerates the 
process side of publicness. 
 
When entities fail to acknowledge their publicness, or to manage 
with an understanding of it, the omission can result in a process 
through which private ordering is diminished.38 Ignoring the social 
license can lead to the elimination of private privileges and their 
replacement with laws, regulations, and substantive publicness. 
Media coverage and public outrage develops and the process of 
publicness creates pressure that, in turn, for example, resulted in 
several new layers of federal regulation for boards of directors in 
response to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. As a result of 
congressional action, both the Sarbanes-Oxley39 and Dodd-Frank 
Acts40 now regulate director qualifications for the board and for 
some committees.41 In addition, federal regulation requires boards to 
have particular committees (audit, compensation, and nomination 
and governance).42 The regulations also set forth requirements for 
“independent” members of these committees. Yet, committees and 
membership were, before the governance crises mandating them, 
subject to private ordering.43 Thus, these examples also reveal how 
the process of publicness results in the substance of publicness. 
 
                                                 
36 Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness”, supra note 38; Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 
supra note 14; Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14; Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 14. 
37 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 36.  
38 Cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 846-50 
(discussing, in the context of family-law, how legal doctrine shapes childhood both through 
substance and omissions). 
39 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (2012). 
40 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5); 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See also Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in 
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42 17 CFR 229.407. 
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II. The Publicness of Wells Fargo and Uber. 
 
Consider two companies: Wells Fargo, a publicly-held bank perceived 
to be a leader in the financial services industry, and Uber, a privately- 
held start-up. Both companies are reeling from scandals, as well as 
the resulting media attention and publicness process. Through their 
respective responses to these scandals, the companies demonstrate 
the power and cost of publicness and are excellent case studies for 
examining the role that social license can play in the boardroom and 
in managing the process and substance of publicness. 
 
A. Wells Fargo. 
 
Wells Fargo has met with considerable publicness as a result of its 
recent account scandal. This fact pattern provides an opportunity for 
analyzing how the process of publicness, and the attendant 
substantive outcomes, have impacted the company, and where 
board attention to social license could have made a difference. 
Ultimately, Wells Fargo’s paid a steep price. It’s CEO, John Stumpf, 
was ousted and lost millions when the company clawed back his pay, 
out-of-pocket costs for Wells Fargo have reached $2 billion and are 
climbing, and its actions are subject to scrutiny resulting in 
government imposed governance changes.44 He, along with many of 
his colleagues, failed to appreciate the power of publicness and its 
potential impact on the company and its license to operate. 
 
At the end of the fourth quarter of 2018, Wells Fargo was ranked 
third in terms of deposits and fourth among U.S. banks based on 
assets ($1.9 Trillion),45 a decline from its standings in 2017. At the 
end of the first quarter of 2017, Wells Fargo ranked third among U.S. 
banks based on assets ($2.0 Trillion).46 In 2016, according to Forbes, 
it was the 7th largest company in the world based on assets, profits, 
                                                 
44 Tyler Durden, Wells Fargo Claws Back Additional $72 Million From John Stumpf, Former 
Retail Banking Head, ZERO HEDGE (Apr. 10, 2017 7:48 AM), 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-04- 10/wells-fargo-claws-back-additional-72-
million-john-stumpf-former-retail-banking-head. 
45 Wells Fargo Today, WELLS FARGO (2018), 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/wells-fargo-today.pdf 
46 Wells Fargo Today, WELLS FARGO (2017), 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/wells-fargo-today.pdf. 
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sales, and revenue.47 In terms of revenue alone, it was the 26th 
largest company in the United States.48 Indeed, no matter the 
measure or index, Wells Fargo is a very large company. 
 
Since 2016, Wells Fargo, a financial services company providing 
banking, insurance, investments, mortgage, and consumer and 
commercial financial services,49 has been reacting to a series of 
revelations about its sales and other practices. These revelations 
have badly damaged the company’s reputation and earnings model. 
The bank had long operated in a decentralized manner, with three 
key operating segments: community banking, wholesale banking, and 
wealth management.50 The roots of this scandal are in the 
community bank segment. 
 
So, what was at the heart of the Wells Fargo scandal? Lack of 
attention to the company’s status, its social license, and the process 
of publicness. This lack of attention manifested as unacceptable 
consumer practices, toxic incentives, and grievous risk management. 
Wells Fargo employees engaged in a series of fraudulent 
transactions, including opening unauthorized customer bank, credit 
card, auto insurance, and other accounts. Customers did not know 
about these accounts, and many did not realize the accounts existed 
– even after being charged fees. Employees – at least 5000 of them – 
were pressured and incentivized to create these accounts. In some 
cases, the pressure was “extreme.”51 Employees said they received 
multiple calls from supervisors per day, demanding updates on sales 
goals.52 The bank ranked them against each other, with 
compensation and promotion tied to the goals.53 Some employees 
were specifically encouraged to sell unnecessary products.54 Sales 
rankings were circulated regularly and eliminated only after regional 
leaders pushed back, citing a culture of shaming and perpetual sales 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Wells Fargo, supra note 48. 
49 Wells Fargo, supra note 49.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 7. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 20. 
54 Id. at 7. 
15  
pressure.55 Further, employees who could not meet the goals feared 
peaking in the fourth quarter of 2013. 56 
 
Why did cross-selling occur? Because that is how banks make money. 
In general, a single account at a bank brings little profit; however, 
some products, like mortgages, are quite lucrative.57 The more 
accounts or products a consumer has, the more likely that consumer 
is to stay with the bank and to engage in higher dollar transactions.58 
A simple set of calculations based on the number of customers and 
the increased number of products per customer during the high-
pressure cross-selling period at Wells Fargo, reveals the bank likely 
made billions through cross-sells.59 Although not all of these cross-
sells were the result of fraud, the power of the cross-sell termination 
or “career-hindering criticism.”60 In fact, “sales integrity - related 
allegations and associated terminations and resignations increased 
relatively steadily from the second quarter of 2007,” is nevertheless 
evident.61  
 
The Wells Fargo situation is typical of other sales-related frauds. As 
sales grow, the pressure to sustain and increase sales also grows. In 
fact, the sales model at the Community Bank was volume-focused 
and “relied heavily on year-over-year sales growth.”62 The result was 
more pressure on the sales force and that, in turn, lead to sales- 
integrity issues.63 From sandbagging (withholding sales in a particular 
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57 See, e.g., Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, NEW YORKER (Sep. 12, 2016) 
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quarter to push them into the next) to accounts with de minimis 
funding, the evidence of problems both existed and grew.64 When an 
investigative newspaper report exposed the issues, the company’s 
board finally focused on the problem and the pressure for sales 
growth “moderated somewhat.”65 Integrity problems and other 
issues also decreased.66  
 
Nevertheless, the problems persisted for a very long time. As early as 
2002, the Community Bank began to see growth in sales practice 
violations.67 An internal report from 2004 reveals both an increase in 
violations, as well as an increase in terminations.68 But there was 
little willingness to address the issues. According to the 2017 report 
of an independent investigation, prepared at the behest of the Wells 
Fargo board of directors (the “2017 Independent Report”), the 
Community Bank’s efforts to address the concerns were 
“incremental, implemented slowly and insufficient to address the 
root causes of the problem.”69 In part, this was because the 
leadership was “disinclin[ed]” to see the systemic nature of the 
fraud.70 Instead, the culture was one of blame for employees and lack 
of analysis as to the root causes. This was true despite employees 
calling the company’s hotline and reporting problems.71 
 
Moreover, the account-creation process went on for many years, 
ending only when the situation publicly imploded. Indeed, before this 
consumer fraud hit the presses, an analyst from Rafferty Capital, who 
had personal experience banking with Wells Fargo following the 
Wachovia merger, stated that he did not believe the story Wells 
Fargo told: that doughnuts, seating, and service accounted for its 
continued growth and success. Instead, in his opinion, employee 
                                                 
64 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 65 at 21.  
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management and incentives had to be the reason.72 He was half 
right. That does not, however, actually answer the “how” question. 
How did these practices happen, on a fairly large scale, without 
anyone higher up knowing or noticing? The answer is that people did 
know. However, Wells Fargo’s culture and organizational structure 
prevented the information from flowing upwards and that, in turn, 
contributed to the board’s failure to do its job – monitoring the 
company’s public nature and preventing the process of publicness.  
 
Interestingly, Wells Fargo exited the financial crisis of 2008-2009 with 
a relatively clean and positive reputation. Its CEO, John Stumpf, was 
praised for his management style and the way in which Wells Fargo 
weathered the crisis. One magazine article described Wells Fargo as 
the “big winner in the financial crisis” and analyzed how Stumpf, and 
the Wells Fargo business model, resulted in it growing and thriving at 
a time when the rest of the banking industry was still recovering.73 
Ironically, at the time that article appeared in The Economist, the 
practices that caused the recent scandal were gathering steam within 
the company.74 
 
The decentralized nature of Wells Fargo contributed to the scandal. 
Decentralization and deference to business unit leaders is a hallmark 
of the company. The leader of the Community Bank at the time of 
the scandal was Carrie Tolstedt. She was widely perceived to be both 
very successful and close to Stumpf, who was himself a proponent of 
decentralized management.75 She was also criticized as insular, 
defensive, and “notoriously resistant to outside intervention and 
oversight.”76 This, in combination with decentralization, contributed 
to the lack of visibility into the cross-selling issues and the inevitable 
demands for accountability that ensued. Indeed, decentralization 
“challenges the notion of a strong corporate culture and 
governance.” Simply put, the more you decentralize, the more you 
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allow for decisions to be made, and messages to be carried, in 
different ways.77 
 
Consider the decentralization of the risk function. At Wells Fargo, 
lines of business had their own risk managers who answered to the 
heads of their business, and not, for example, to a central risk- 
management person.78 Thus, it was not until after the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, in 2011, that the board created a Risk Committee to 
oversee risk across all the units at Wells Fargo.79 The Risk Committee 
apparently decided that the right approach was to grow the central 
risk function, endow it with both the responsibility and the ability to 
oversee risk in the lines of business, and provide it with increased 
funding.80 This process did not begin until 2014, however, and took 
three years to complete.81  
 
Other functions at Wells were also decentralized. For example, the 
Community Bank had its own Human Resources department.82 
Consequently, the problems with employee terminations, turnover, 
and other issues in the Community Bank were seen in isolation and 
not compared to those of other divisions.83 Fragmentation 
compounded the problem, diminishing transparency and visibility.  
 
Moreover, the perception at Wells Fargo was that the issues were of 
“modest significance.”84 The internal understanding of “customer 
harm” was limited to fees and penalties (the zone of legal license), as 
opposed to brand, reputation, or consumer trust.85 Yet, brand, 
reputation, and trust are precisely in the space of publicness and, as 
explored in Part III, are in the zone of social license. They are also 
issues within the domain of the board and its fiduciary duties – 
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despite the fact that the Wells board did not seem to be paying 
attention.  
 
So, what did the Wells board know, and when did it know it? Well, 
we know now that Stumpf was in fact aware of the problems at least 
as early as 2002.86 Recall that the board had established a Risk 
Committee in 2011, but that it did not really begin work until 2014. 
Then, following the Los Angeles Times news articles in early 2014, 
management began to identify and report risky sales practices to the 
board and the Risk Committee.87 But it was too little, too late. In 
May 2015, the Los Angeles City Attorney sued, alleging “widespread 
and improper sales practices.” Scrutiny of Wells Fargo increased. As 
the process of publicness began to take hold, so did the costs to the 
company and the board, including the cost of hiring outside 
consultants to investigate and report on the scandal and develop 
proposals for change.  
 
Nevertheless, as the 2017 Independent Report makes clear, 
management information to the board was inadequate and 
inaccurate.88 For example, the board was told that 230 employees 
had been terminated, but those figures were not aggregated (despite 
requests from the Risk Committee) and, therefore, underrepresented 
the significance of the terminations.89 In addition, according to the 
2017 Independent Report, management provided information on 
enhanced monitoring that lacked detailed and concrete plans; yet, 
neither the board nor the Risk Committee insisted on better plans.90  
 
This failure on the part of the board occurred as the scope of the 
scandal grew. For example, to meet cross-sell sales targets, 
employees opened millions of fake accounts, without customer 
consent, over a period of at least five to seven years.91 There were 
unauthorized deposit accounts and unauthorized credit card 
applications. Initial estimates of fees to the bank were relatively low, 
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$2.6 million, in comparison to the size of Wells Fargo and what was 
later revealed.92 Moreover, as the company continues to release 
information, it is increasingly apparent that the size of the scandal is 
far larger than initially reported, perhaps going back 15 years, 
impacting many more customers, and bringing in more fees.93  
 
The dollar costs of the scandal are very large and growing. The 
company paid $185 million in fines in 2016 and a considerable 
amount in legal costs. In the first quarter of 2017, it spent an 
additional $80 million in costs related to the situation.94 Moreover, 
the company initially predicted that the level of clean-up spending 
would continue to increase through most of 2017, resulting in dollar 
costs (to be distinguished from opportunity costs) in the range of 
$425 million.95 More recent predictions are even higher.96Then, in 
2018, Wells Fargo agreed to pay out $575 million for violating 
consumer protection laws as a part of a settlement covering 
consumers in all fifty states.97  
 
Since the scandal, Wells Fargo has also lost another CEO. Tim Sloan 
stepped down on March 28, 2019. Sloan became the CEO after 
Stumpf’s forced resignation. His attempts to clean up the company’s 
image were unsuccessful. After his departure, Wells Fargo stated that 
it would look for external candidates, a move supported by Warren 
Buffet, whose company Berkshire Hathaway is Wells Fargo’s single 
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largest shareholder. 98Buffett commented that although there are 
good candidates from Wall Street and the financial sector, “they are 
going automatically going to draw the ire of a significant percentage 
of the Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, and that’s just 
not smart.”99  
 
The company has also closed over 400 branches100 and plans to close 
800 more by 2020.101 The Federal Reserve has placed limits on the 
growth of the company restricting the firm from increasing past its 
total asset size beyond that listed as of the end of 2017. Wells Fargo 
must make “sufficient improvements” to prevent misconduct before 
the limitations will be lifted. Employees have also filed law suits 
related to the sales goals and terminations.102 Investigations abound, 
with the SEC and the Department of Justice and other government 
agencies involved.103 Now, estimates of the out-of-pocket costs to 
Wells Fargo are at $2 billion and climbing.104 
 
Further, each investigation carries the risk of uncovering new issues 
and further publicness. For example, auto-insurance fraud was 
announced in July of 2017.105 The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency also fined Wells 
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Fargo a total of $1 billion for the auto-insurance scandal in 2018.106 
Fines and settlement costs, of course, do not include the time of 
employees, managers, and directors that could have been spent on 
real growth and technological advancements. These are the 
opportunity costs of failing to account for publicness.107  
 
Time spent responding to Congress and congressional investigations 
is also an opportunity cost. As is typical in this type of situation, 
Congress became part of the governance and business discussion. 
Senators demanded an investigation by the Justice Department108 
and members of the House Financial Services Committee demanded 
Stumpf’s presence and resignation (which came to pass).109 One 
Republican member described the scandal as follows: “Fraud is fraud. 
Theft is theft. And what happened at Wells Fargo over the course of 
many years cannot be described any other way.”110 Arbitration 
clauses are endemic; nevertheless, Senators “slammed” Wells Fargo 
for the inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses for customer 
accounts, arguing that the clauses enabled the frauds.111 Still others 
asked the Department of Labor to investigate whether the company’s 
actions with respect to employees violated the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.112 And, Senator Elizabeth Warren, D. Mass, declared that Stumpf 
should face criminal charges.113  Further, In 2019, a House committee 
called Wells Fargo’s CEO, Tim Sloan, in again to testify. Right after the 
hearing, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a 
statement. “We continue to be disappointed with [Wells Fargo’s] 
performance under our consent orders and its inability to execute 
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effective corporate governance and a successful risk management 
program.”114  
 
Moreover, “Wells Fargo isn't sure it will ever recover from the 
slowdown.”115 Why? Because the numbers it hit in the past were 
achieved through high pressure sales targets paired with incentives. 
As the cause of the frauds, those targets and incentives have been 
eliminated. The past quarterly and annual results were, however, 
inflated by the frauds and loom as targets the company cannot now 
reach. 
 
Indeed, the “understandability” or accessibility of this scandal (false 
consumer accounts), in combination with the direct consumer 
impact, prompted Senator Jon Tester (D. MT) to respond to Stumpf’s 
congressional testimony with the following: you have “done 
something I’ve never seen in 10 years: You have united this 
committee — and not in a good way.”116 Although “the public 
expects international financial banks to lose billions in nefarious ways 
… learning that the American checking account has been co-opted 
has insidious wrinkles. This is supposed to be one of the most trusted 
things in the world.”117 
 
In fact, what Wells did was to risk its credibility in the community and 
diminish trust in the banking system, and it did so at a time when the 
banks were already at a low point in terms of community support.118 
The board appears to have been a victim of the Wells Fargo 
mythology, built, in part by the media that tore it down. In short, the 
board failed to account for the power of publicness, the risks of its 
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incentive system and sales tactics, or its social license. As a result, it 
continues to suffer from the process of publicness in the public arena 
and is encountering considerable substantive publicness in the form 
of enforcement and pressure for governance changes. 
 
B. UBER 
 
The Uber scandals have demonstrated that publicness does not occur 
only in publicly-held companies. Instead, Uber’s situation reveals that 
it, too, is a creature of the public, and thus, can also be subject to 
substantive and process publicness when scandal erupts. Indeed, as a 
result of its scandals, Uber’s CEO was ousted and replaced, board 
membership and governance practices were changed, and corporate 
choice continue to be scrutinized by the government and media. Not 
surprisingly, lawsuits against the company piled up.119 
 
Uber – started ten years ago – connects drivers to riders through an 
app at rates usually less than those charged by taxi services.120 Uber 
is pursuing an IPO aiming for a valuation of $100 billion.121 Its growth 
has been “remarkable,”122 and yet, the company still has no 
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“sustainable or profitable business model.”123 In fact, the company 
burns through cash. Uber burned through $8 billion as of August 
2017,124 and currently burns through $1 billion a year.125  
 
How do we know these numbers? They are the result of the process 
of publicness. Uber is a private company and, therefore, is not 
required to release its financials publicly. However, when faced with 
a series of scandals, Uber made its financials public in order to argue 
that “its revenue growth is outpacing losses, [and] hoping to show 
the business is on a strong trajectory.”126 Yet, as analysts have 
pointed out, the company is a “cash burning machine,”127 facing a 
series of scandals and controversies, which, in turn, have created 
pressure on the governance structure and business choices. In short, 
Uber has been forced to reexamine its “private” status through the 
process of publicness and is now facing substantive publicness as 
well. 
 
Let’s examine the scandals. They have been percolating for several 
years but, as a result of more recent news attention, are being 
repeated and reassessed. For example, in 2012, Uber invoked surge 
pricing in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, doubling fares while public 
transportation was unavailable.128 This issue is now cited repeatedly 
as an instance of Uber’s social insensitivity and pursuit of its own 
ends, without regard to impact on the public.129 In 2013-2014, Uber 
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was accused of booking fake rides and spamming Lyft drivers.130 As in 
the Wells Fargo scandal, the people doing the canceling were Uber 
employees, including employees paid to recruit drivers. Uber then 
attempted to keep its drivers from working for both companies by 
texting them and falsely claiming that it was illegal to do so.131 When 
the truth was publicly revealed, the company back-tracked on its 
practices.132 
 
Next, an Uber executive suggested that the company hire opposition 
researchers and journalists to aid the company in attacking the 
personal lives and families of reporters who wrote “unflattering” 
stories about the company.133 Apparently, he made this comment in 
response to an article by a female reporter who accused Uber of 
sexism and misogyny.134 When his suggestion was made public it 
contributed to pressure on the company to step up its reaction to 
sexism and other cultural deficiencies. 
 
Then, there is the God View technology. In late 2014, it was revealed 
that the God View program, which was imbedded in the Uber app, 
allowed Uber to track the location of users 24/7.135 Uber was in fact 
doing so, “spying on celebrities,” including Beyoncé and reporters.136 
When the spying was revealed, it attracted outrage among users. 
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Indeed, one famous tech user deleted the app and described “the 
privacy violation as symptomatic of Uber’s wider arrogance and dirty 
business practices.”137 In 2016, after revelations from a 
whistleblower, the Company entered into a settlement that required 
it to remove “all personally identifiable information of riders … limit[] 
employee access to personally identifiable information of riders, and. 
. . audit[] employee access to personally identifiable information in 
general.”138 
 
However, 2017 is the year in which many of the problems became 
transparently public and thus escalated. The first issues were with 
Uber’s self-driving vehicle pilot program in California, which Uber 
started without applying for the proper permits. On the first day of 
the program, vehicles ran red lights and created hazards in bike 
lanes.139 The company’s response was to blame human error for the 
mistakes, but The New York Times reported that the mistakes were in 
fact in the self-driving technology.140 Uber was forced to remove the 
cars from the road,141 but later launched self-driving cars in Arizona, 
where one crashed.142 
 
Also in 2017, Waymo, a unit of Google parent Alphabet, sued Uber, 
accusing it and Anthony Levandowski, the engineer in charge of the 
program, of trade secret violations.143 The claim was that 
Levandowski, who used to work for Waymo, took several gigabytes 
of confidential documents when he left Waymo after meeting with 
Uber executives.144 The case settled abruptly in 2018 with Uber 
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agreeing to refrain from using Waymo hardware or software in 
Uber’s self-driving cars. Additionally, Waymo will receive .34% equity 
in Uber as part of the settlement agreement.145  
 
Uber also settled a false advertising claim for $25 million in 2017.146 
Those misled were its customers– both with respect to the customer 
safety policy and fees for tolls and airport drop offs.147 The company 
also paid $28.5 million to settle class actions with similar 
allegations.148 Nevertheless, it now faces still another class action for 
the approximately 160,000 drivers in California who claim they are 
employees, not independent contractors.149 So far, the dollar value of 
the settlements is relatively small but, as the process of publicness 
unfolds, more cases and settlements will occur. 
 
Indeed, Greyball, which has attracted government enforcement 
interest, may well become one such case. Uber’s legal team 
approved the use of Greyball, a tool that allowed Uber to identify and 
evade law enforcement in the communities in which it was 
operating.150 The program allowed Uber to identify law enforcement 
officials who were attempting to catch Uber’s illegal operations by 
using the application to arrange rides.151 When Uber thought it had 
identified potential enforcement officials hailing rides, it would 
provide them with a fake ghost-car version of the app and no driver 
would be dispatched.152 In doing so, it was able to evade both 
enforcement and the costs of enforcement, including payments for 
impounded cars and tickets of drivers operating illegally.153 The 
                                                 
145 Aarian Marshall, Uber and Waymo Abruptly Settle for $245 Million, WIRED (February 8, 2019, 
12:17 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/uber-waymo-lawsuit-settlement/. 
146 Tracey Lien, Uber Agrees to Settlement of up to $25 Million in Misleading-advertising Suit, 
L.A. TIMES (April 7, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-
0408-uber-settlement-story.html. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (March 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-
authorities.html. 
151 Mike Isaac, Uber Faces Federal Inquiry Over Use of Greyball Tool to Evade Authorities, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/technology/uber-federal-
inquiry- software-greyball.html?mcubz=1. 
152 Id. 
153 Issac, supra note 154.  
29  
Department of Justice is currently investigating Uber’s use of 
Greyball.154 
 
Travis Kalanick, Uber’s CEO, was also caught on camera yelling at an 
Uber driver.155 Why? Because the driver asked him about decreased 
fares.156 Kalanick later issued an apology and said he would seek 
leadership help – noting that it was “the first time [he was] willing to 
admit that [he] need[ed] leadership help.”157 This sort of statement, 
unthinkable in a publicly-held company, is a direct result of the 
pressure that was building on Uber, and the CEO, to be more 
responsive to the public. It was also a direct result of the company’s 
failure to operate as if it existed with permission – perhaps because it 
never sought permission in the first place; instead, its business model 
involved operating outside of the regulatory environment.158 
 
In September 2017 the company was featured in yet another highly- 
publicized controversy. This time when the city of London decided 
not to renew Uber’s private hire vehicle license, new CEO Dara 
Khosrowshahi released a public apology letter in the Evening 
Standard, acknowledging that Uber needed to change its practices 
and run the business with “humility, integrity and passion.”159 This 
language represents a sharp change from Kalanick’s brash, public 
                                                 
154 Isaac, supra note 155. Uber Faces Federal Inquiry Over Use of Greyball Tool to Evade 
Authorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/technology/uber-federal-inquiry- software-
greyball.html?mcubz=1. 
155 Eric Newcomer, In Video, Uber CEO Argues with Driver Over Falling Fares, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
28, 2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-28/in-video-uber-
ceo- argues-with-driver-over-falling-fares; Julia Carrie Wong, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick 
Caught on Video Arguing with Driver about Fares, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2017,5:07 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/28/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-driver- 
argument-video-fare-prices. 
156 Steven Overly, What Uber Drivers Think about CEO Travis Kalanick Yelling at One of Their Own, 
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/03/01/what-uber-drivers-think-
about-ceo-travis-kalanick-yelling-at-one-of-their-own/?utm_term=.64f146ecfba6. 
157 Travis Kalanick, A Profound Apology, UBER (Feb. 28, 2017), https://newsroom.uber.com/a-
profound-apology/. 
158 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
383 (2017). 
159 Pipp Crerar, Uber Boss Dara Khosrowshahi Says Sorry and Promises to ‘Make Things Right’ 
for Londoners…As He Pledges to Fight TfL Ban, EVENING STANDARD (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/uber-boss-says-sorry-to- londoners-and-
pledges-to-fight-tfl-licence-ban-a3642631.html (quoting Dara Khosrowshahi). 
30  
flaunting of regulation – and an understanding that the company’s 
legal license, and not just its social license, to operate was in 
jeopardy. 
 
The biggest hit, however, appears to have occurred when Susan 
Fowler, a former employee, published a blog with details of sexual 
harassment and gender bias at the company.160 The blog included a 
description of messages from her manager about his open 
relationship and desire to find women with whom to have sex.161 
According to Fowler, Uber’s Human Resources personnel responded 
to her report about the situation by stating that it was the man’s first 
offense and that that he was a high performer, before addressing 
Fowler’s “options,” neither of which addressed the actions of her 
harasser.162 According to the blog, Fowler later learned both that the 
man had in fact pursued other women and that Human Resources 
knew.163 This blog, which contained other details mentioned below, 
was the catalyst for at least two internal investigations, as well as 
eventual changes in the board structure and Kalanick’s resignation.164 
 
The largest investigation as a result of these scandals and the 
growing level of scrutiny resulted from Fowler’s blog post and was 
initiated by the Uber board of directors.165 Eric Holder led this 
investigation and it involved over 200 interviews, a review of over 3 
million documents, and, in addition to the lawyers, a consulting firm 
assisted in the effort to collect information from a broad group of 
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employees.166 In short, this investigation and the resulting report (the 
“Holder Report”) was not cheap. 
 
Although Uber is a private company, it is a consumer-focused one, 
and the process of publicness and the need to show it was open to 
change, forced it to make the Holder Report public.167 The Holder 
Report contains a series of recommendations aimed at changing the 
company’s culture and developing trust, transformation, and 
accountability.168 These proposals include: diminishing Kalanick’s role 
(the report was released prior to his resignation), establishing criteria 
for the COO, developing performance reviews to create 
accountability in senior leadership, improving and empowering 
diversity efforts, and ensuring that Human Resources operates 
appropriately and under the supervision of the board.169 A well- 
functioning company would already have all of these procedures and 
policies in place, but Uber did not– perhaps in part because it was not 
publicly held and, therefore, not subject to the type of ex ante, 
substantive publicness described in Part I of this Article. And, perhaps 
because its board failed to understand the role of social license. 
 
Notably, however, the Holder Report also called for enhanced board 
oversight, with an independent chair, an oversight committee, 
improved compensation programs, and increased internal controls 
both at the board level and beyond.170 These are the same types of 
substantive publicness that Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank have 
already imposed on publicly-traded companies as part of the 
publicness inherent in the social control of capital and access to 
capital that the federal securities laws prescribe.171 Now, as a result 
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of the process of publicness, they will become part of Uber’s 
governance – despite its “private” status. 
 
Uber’s board was not atypical for a private, venture-backed firm 
where the focus is capital raising and sustaining a business long 
enough to exit at a profit. But the desire of Kalanick (and, arguably 
other Unicorn and tech CEOs) to maintain power and operate outside 
of the public zone, resulted in a very large company without internal 
controls or attention to social license. Now, however, Uber will 
operate more like a publicly-held company and, through its new CEO, 
has acknowledged its failures and the need to attend to its social 
license. 
 
Moreover, following the board’s acceptance of the Holder Report, a 
form of substantive publicness, Kalanick stepped down as CEO – after 
previously saying he would take only a leave of absence. Kalanick was 
not alone. Uber, like Wells Fargo, has lost a string of its executives 
due to its scandals. Levandowski stepped down.172 Jeff Jones, 
President of Ridesharing, resigned after only a few months in his 
role.173 Rachel Whetstone, SVP of Communications and Policy, 
resigned.174 Brian McClendon, the head of mapping also resigned, 
and so did Raffi Krikorian, one of the self-driving leaders.175 Amit 
Singhal, SVP of Engineering is out.176 Ed Baker, the VP of Product and 
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Growth is out.177 And, so is Gary Marcus, Head of Uber AI Labs;178 
Sherif Marakby, VP of Global Vehicle Programs;179 Josh Mohrer, GM 
of New York City;180 Guatam Gupta, Head of Finance;181 Eric 
Alexander, Head of Asia Business;182 Emil Michael, SVP of Business 
and Sallie Yoo, General Counsel.183 
 
In addition, the company announced it had fired 20 employees in 
response to a separate investigative report (the “Perkins Coie 
Report”), produced by the Perkins Coie firm, on harassment issues.184 
The Perkins Coie Report, too, was initiated in response to Fowler’s 
blog.185 The Perkins Coie Report stated that the firm had initiated 
investigations into 215 harassment claims, and that although 100 
claims required no action, 57 were still under review and 31 
employees were being enrolled in training or counseling.186 As with 
the governance issues addressed in the Holder Report, Uber is now 
publicly discussing its employment processes – attempting to justify 
them to the public.187 
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Nevertheless, in the midst of the Holder and Perkins Coie reports and 
discussions, a member of the board made a sexist comment.188 The 
statement was made when the only female member of the board at 
the time, Arianna Huffington, noted that another woman was joining 
the board.189 A male member of the board, also an investor, 
responded by saying that there would be “more talking” on the 
board as a result.190 The comment was rapidly released to the press, 
the process of publicness ensued, and David Bonderman, the board 
member who made the comment, then apologized and resigned.191 
 
As these examples reveal, as result of the publicness attendant to its 
numerous scandals, Uber lost the privilege of keeping its decisions 
and processes “private.” Instead, internal debates, employment 
matters, and financials are made public, both by the company and by 
employees. The aforementioned blog post, in addition to sexual 
harassment claims, detailed wasted resources, withheld business- 
critical information, abandoned projects, and “unrelenting chaos.”192 
The blog even related a bizarre story about an initial decision to buy 
leather jackets for all of Uber’s engineers, but then deciding to buy  
them just for the men.193 The justification? There were so few 
women left in the department that the discount for women’s jackets 
was no longer available.194 This story seems like a parody in light of 
issues being raised about the company more broadly, but is arguably 
emblematic of the larger culture at Uber. 
 
Importantly, from a process of publicness perspective, the point is 
that this story, too, is public. The public now knows the depth of the 
culture issues that Human Resources and others were ignoring, and it 
also knows that employees used the publicness process to expose it. 
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Or, in the words of a column from vox, a former employee “deftly 
and surgically laid out the map that the media and others would use 
to prove to its out-to-lunch board and waffling investors that Uber 
CEO Travis Kalanick had to go.”195 Two venture capitalists agreed and 
hand-delivered a letter to Travis Kalanick asking him to resign as CEO 
immediately. The contents of that letter are now public as a result of 
the Waymo litigation.196 
 
As a result of the scandals and the growing level of scrutiny of Uber, 
the company remains in an unrelenting process of publicness and 
consequently the board’s decision-making process also became 
public. Details of the CEO search process were provided to the 
media.197 Names of potential CEOs were vetted not only by the 
board, but by the media as well.198 The fractured nature of the board 
became a topic of conversation.199 Indeed, one editorial compared 
the press leaks at Uber to those of the Trump White House, 
concluding that the White House press relations were tighter than 
Uber’s.200 These leaks and the dramas are bad for investors and for 
business. They reveal insiders using outsiders (the media) to make 
governance changes. Insiders are deploying the process of publicness 
to create sufficient pressure to make the company more accountable, 
transparent, and substantively public. 
 
The process of publicness also impacted Uber’s business model. Uber 
made its way into the business world with an idea and an app that 
was premised on operating outside of the regulatory environment. In 
order to evade legal licensing and other processes, it termed its 
business “ride-sharing.” The purpose of using this term was to avoid 
taxi status; and the semantic sleight of hand worked for a period of 
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time. But now, publicness is catching up. The scandals and business 
model (“ask forgiveness, not permission”) converged, and regulatory 
and other actions increased. Investigations blossomed, internally and 
externally, and even abroad.201 The CEO was ousted and replaced, 
board membership and governance practices changed, and actions 
were scrutinized by the government and the media. Not surprisingly, 
lawsuits against the company piled up in the wake of the scandals, 
and in some instances, have resulted in costly settlement 
agreements.202 In short, Uber is a textbook example of how process 
publicness leads to substantive publicness. 
 
Although it is too early to know whether the impact on Uber’s 
business was significant, the competition did gain traction– no small 
matter, given Uber’s burn rate. Lyft is Uber’s biggest competitor and, 
although Uber still has the largest percentage of travelers, Lyft’s 
share has been growing.203 In February of 2015, Uber captured 90% 
of the market.204 Now, Lyft has 29 percent of the market, up three 
percentage points from last year but significantly from 2015.205 Lyft’s 
growth has outpaced Uber’s, especially on the West Coast where 
Lyft’s market shares are among its largest.206 In fact, Lyft has 44 
percent of the market in Seattle, Washington.207  
 
Further, even though the average Lyft ride may be less expensive 
than the average Uber ride,208 the companies are seen as competitive 
on pricing and reliability. Thus, competition is largely in the zone of 
“brand and experience.”209 Lyft drivers make more money and report 
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being more satisfied than Uber drivers,210 and at least one company 
announced that, in light of the ethical issues at Uber, it would not 
reimburse employees who use Uber for business travel.211 Indeed, 
delete-the-app boycotts grew throughout 2017.212 In cities in which 
both Lyft and Uber were well-established, these boycotts were 
problems for Uber.213 In short, the scandals, failures, and chaos at 
Uber, in combination with the process of publicness, increased Lyft’s 
business opportunities.214 
 
Finally, the process of publicness and its impact did not stop with 
Uber. To the dismay of those in Silicon Valley, Uber’s scandal parade 
has resulted in calls for reform at other companies. Declaring that 
“Uber was a failure of Silicon Valley’s start-up machine,” Farhad 
Manjoo of The New York Times argued that Uber is just one of many 
companies flouting regulations and the rule of law. He states that 
Uber suffered from a failure of oversight from investors, directors, 
and partners and anyone else– in part because it was privately held 
and not subject to the ex ante regulatory, substantive form of 
publicness. Certainly, Uber’s board lacked an understanding of both 
publicness and social license. As a result, it faces an array of 
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enforcement actions and litigation, both of which are forms of ex 
post publicness.215 
 
III. The Theory of Social License 
 
The lessons to be learned from both the Wells Fargo and Uber 
scandals, and from their resulting publicness outcomes, are powerful 
ones. Social license theory provides both a tool for exploring these 
issues and a potential mechanism to help boards engage in and think 
about for risk management and oversight, spaces where the state- 
law based fiduciary duties have withered. Indeed, at least part of the 
issue at Wells Fargo was that managers at the Community Bank did 
not appreciate the potential harm because, in part, they “failed to 
frame the issue appropriately.”216 Terminations were not assessed in 
the context of customer harm. Harm was evaluated only with respect 
to false fees or charges, not with respect to the associated misuse of 
personal information or reputational risk to the bank.217 In short, the 
problems were assessed only in an isolated and transactional fashion, 
without attention to the long-run consequences of the choices and 
risks and how those could compound through the process of 
publicness. The focus was legal license, or evading it, not publicness 
or risk management or corporate sustainability and relationships -- 
the zone of social license. The same is true of Uber and its board and 
officers. 
 
Social license theory, then, offers a mechanism for understanding 
and managing the role of accountability and publicness in 
corporations. In fact, adapting the construct of social license to the 
corporate governance context provides an analytical approach for 
boards to use when managing publicness and risk. In that sense, 
then, it is a tool for cost benefit analysis that deepens the 
understanding of costs and promotes a bilateral approach to a 
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company’s place with its communities and stakeholders.218 Social 
license can also play a gap-filling role for fiduciary duties. 
 
The term, “social license to operate,” is frequently used in extractive 
industries.219 It is a term that is easier to define in the negative, i.e. 
how a company loses it, than in the positive, i.e. how a company 
earns it. But, as the use of the term and its implications have grown 
over the years, so too have models for conceptualizing social license 
and understanding its value as an analytical tool.220 Indeed, the 
World Bank and other international organizations discuss social 
license as a driver for investment decisions, making understanding 
and developing social licenses critical for entities.221 As this part of 
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the Article reveals, social license is also a useful analog to publicness 
and to corporate governance more generally. 
 
The basic concept of social license is that businesses (and other 
entities) exist with permission from the communities in which they 
are located, as well as with permission from larger communities and 
stakeholders.222 As noted in the BlackRock letter, business are more 
than just economic institutions; they are also social institutions.223 As 
a result, they are subject to more than just legal oversight. They are 
subject to public accountability and, at times, public control and need 
to attend to social license.224 
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Of course, businesses require legal licenses, including permits, 
securities registration (for public companies), and other regulatory 
approvals, but these provide only a baseline. Legal licenses form a set 
of permissions that allow a company to operate within legal bounds. 
Social license, however, is a form of permission derived from the 
community, stakeholders, and others, and it exists in the realm 
beyond legal license. In this sense, it is a form of self-regulation. 
Social license derives not from legally-granted permission, but 
instead from the development of legitimacy, credibility, and trust 
within the community context. When it operates effectively, social 
license can prevent demonstrations, boycotts, shut downs, and 
negative publicity, as well as the increases in regulation that are a 
hallmark of publicness.225 
 
A company’s social license is not legally constructed; it is socially 
constructed. Thus, the approval and acceptance of a company and its 
projects derive from its social license, for which the reach may well 
exceed that of legal license. As one author states, “social license is 
the judgment by communities about whether [a] company is a proper 
and fitting entity that deserves to be part of [a] community. It’s a 
judgment about the legitimacy of [the] company or operations.”226 
Indeed, social license can “make” a business, contributing to its 
survival and success.227 Conversely, the loss of it can have very 
dramatic implications, including legal liability, reputational losses, 
and even the risk of violence against employees and company 
assets.228 Failure to consider and develop social license can result in 
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business failures, increased levels of regulation, and publicness in the 
form of both substance and process. Thus, managing a company’s 
social license is a form of risk management and a tool for managing 
publicness.229 And, according to one study from Witold Henisz at the 
Wharton School of Business, it can translate into actual dollars.230 
 
There are many companies and boards that currently use social 
license to examine company policies and business strategies.231 It is, 
however, important to note that social license is not completely 
within a company’s control, nor is it a quid pro quo. Instead, entities 
“earn” social license through organizational actions that are justified 
in the “eyes of society” and are not achieved through 
manipulation.232 Effective and sustained social license requires moral 
legitimacy, and that, in turn, is earned through consistent, 
trustworthy behavior, along with solutions and compromises 
achieved through dialogue with relevant sectors of the community.233 
The dialogue is key. Effective social license is bilateral and not the 
result of public relations and marketing alone. 
 
A. The Stages of Social License. 
 
Although scholars have explored the concept of social license 
through various lenses, they tend to emphasize three key stages: 
legitimacy, credibility, and trust.234 These stages correspond to the 
benefits of social license: acceptance, approval, and identity. As 
noted previously, entities must earn and maintain their social 
licenses. Failure to do so, as the case studies discussed in this section 
reveal, can result in significant costs and business losses. 
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1. Legitimacy. 
 
The first stage, legitimacy, is the easiest to achieve and thus forms 
the baseline of social license. Below legitimacy, social license is 
absent or “withdrawn.” Legitimacy leads to the social acceptance of 
the entity.235 Legitimacy exists when the community and 
stakeholders give the company the benefit of the doubt, believing 
that concerns will be addressed and that the company is committed 
to working with the community when issues arise. The legitimacy 
level of social license thus is often tacit, though not necessarily 
silent.236 It requires a widespread perception of fairness. This 
perception can be achieved through consistency and good 
procedures.237 Legitimacy can also require fair distributions of 
benefits.238 
 
Interestingly, once achieved, legitimacy tends to be “resilient to 
particular events.”239 If a company departs from accepted norms, it 
will risk its legitimacy; however, as long as the history between the 
company and the stakeholders is stable, a single event is unlikely to 
disrupt legitimacy. Instead, stakeholders are likely to view the 
particular event as “unique.”240 Significant scandals and sustained, 
repeated questionable activities, however, can undermine 
legitimacy.241 
 
Consider the example of BP and the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline it built in Georgia. The process of developing a social license 
for this project took multiple years, and was both a requirement of 
lenders as well as a commitment by BP. At the time of construction, 
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the pipeline was the “largest cross-border infrastructure construction 
project in the world.”242 As a result of BP’s efforts in the community, 
scholars have concluded that the project had both economic and 
socio-political legitimacy. Moreover, according to the scholars who 
analyzed this project for legitimacy, BP’s strategy documents speak 
directly of social license as important to its business.243 
 
Recall that, in effect, legitimacy “boils down to fairness” both in 
terms of process and benefits.244 To develop legitimacy on the 
Georgia project, BP worked with the community in advance of 
choosing a location for the pipeline.245 The company commissioned a 
regional review, which the International Finance Corporation, one of 
the lenders on the project, described as “ground breaking.”246 This 
review addressed a multitude of issues, including “human rights, 
revenue management, and security.”247 In addition, BP engaged in an 
“extensive public consultation and disclosure program,” a $25 million 
community investment program, a program to build NGO capacity, a 
program for environmental investment, and a program to develop 
links with small and medium enterprises.248 
 
For BP to achieve legitimacy for the pipeline, it had to build an 
understanding of the communities’ cultures and then tailor its 
relationship and programs to those unique cultures.249 The regional 
review it completed was a significant contribution to earning its 
legitimacy.250 The review also provided BP with considerable 
information about various stakeholder groups and allowed it to 
provide more moderate proposals, built through consensus, that in 
some cases were less extensive than initial proposals by some 
groups.251 In short, the review helped BP assess the best route for  
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the pipeline and determine what further actions were critical to 
engaging with the citizens and groups to be impacted, and allowed 
BP to negotiate for different, and in some cases, less expensive 
outcomes.252 
 
Some of the specific commitments that BP followed through on were 
obligations on labor supply and community investment.253 Sharing 
the economic benefits of the project in this manner was central to 
the fairness perception legitimacy requires.254 For example, BP 
committed its contractors and subcontractors to hiring local workers. 
This was important to the local citizens, and it helped BP avoid the 
types of unrest and tension that can arise when a company brings 
workers from outside of the community.255 BP also spent $30 million 
to invest in programs that enriched the pipeline communities, 
including programs for energy efficiency and rebuilding school and 
civic buildings.256 Additionally, individuals within 500 meters of the 
pipeline received compensation for relocating and reported being 
generally satisfied with the amount and the process, for calculating 
the compensation.257 
 
In short, with pressure and requirements from lenders, BP worked to 
earn a social license. It compiled considerable information about 
what was important and necessary to local communities and then 
followed through with funding and policies that established its 
legitimacy in those communities. The scholars who reviewed the 
project several years after its completion concluded that, “although 
there were some concerns about compensation and other issues, 
there was no fundamental opposition to the idea of the pipelines.258 
 
That said, BP and this pipeline are both controversial and legitimacy 
is the lowest level of social license. The pipeline and the process of 
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building it was scrutinized and criticized by various groups,259 and the 
sheer size of it, combined with the tragedy of the Deepwater Horizon 
deaths and oil spill,260 ensure that human rights and other groups will 
scrutinize BP’s actions.261 The ongoing scrutiny is, arguably, part of 
social license. That is, social license is not a one and done 
phenomenon. As the next example will show, it requires continued 
attention and dialogue, because it is bilateral and not just “public 
relations.” 
 
B. Credibility. 
 
The next level of social license is termed “credibility.” Credibility 
requires the prior existence of legitimacy.262 Here, the focus is on the 
company working with stakeholders to achieve more than just tacit 
approval. The company’s goal is to build a relationship that involves 
initial trust and stakeholder voice in the company’s operations.263  
 
Credibility, like legitimacy, requires action and interaction above the 
legally required line.264 For credibility to exist, the entity and the 
project must be “believable,” and the entity’s promises must be both 
realistic and achievable.265 Put differently, before an entity can earn 
credibility, the stakeholders must perceive it to be honest.266 
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In addition to honest and open communication, credibility requires 
deliverables.267 Thus, credibility requires both that the company has 
certain characteristics and that the community believe it has them.268 
Those key qualities include a “high level of technical competence, a 
high level of skills, and a commitment to social performance.”269 The 
latter requires both assessment of potential social and  
environmental issues in advance of the project and mitigation and 
monitoring programs throughout, as well as ongoing social programs 
and compliance commitments.270 
 
Under social license theory, entities that lack credibility face an array 
of problems and business threats. For example, entities without 
credibility may have business operations jeopardized by boycotts and 
other manifestations of social pushback.271 When an entity 
establishes credibility, however, it moves beyond the legitimacy- 
acceptance line and into stakeholder approval.272 
 
San Cristobal, a large mine located in two communities in Bolivia, 
provides an interesting example of the evolution (and devolution) of 
credibility. Initially, the mineral extraction activities were operated by 
a fully-owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Corporation.273 When the 
company moved into the area, it worked to establish legal and social 
licenses, gaining both rights to the minerals and permission from the 
community to start work.274 It developed legitimacy by 
communicating and providing employment for locals.275 
 
After a few years of developing information about the land and 
minerals, it became apparent that there were extensive minerals 
underground, and the company wanted to expand its operations.276 
At this point, it increased discussions with the community and 
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reached an agreement to relocate people away from the mining 
sites.277 The company empowered the community to manage many 
aspects of the relocation, including selecting the new site, designing 
houses and infrastructure, and more.278 At this stage, the community 
members began to feel like co-owners and partners in the project– a 
key component of credibility.279 
 
Shortly after the people relocated, however, women in the 
community expressed dissatisfaction with the housing. They had not 
been included in the decision-making process and were dissatisfied 
with the results.280 In addition, for various reasons, including falling 
metal prices, the company’s value assessment of the project 
changed, and it laid off employees.281 According to scholars who later 
assessed this project, at this point, the company completely lost its 
credibility with the community. Community members no longer 
believed in the programs and processes developed with the 
company. Why? Because the company responded to market signals 
by backing away from commitments and, thereby, disrupting the 
credibility it had built. 
 
The company thus faced serious issues. It did not want to close the 
mine altogether, but it needed to stabilize its relationship with the 
citizens.282 The company initiated an employment program that 
extended beyond the mine into tourism and agriculture, providing 
the community with employment opportunities even during times 
when mineral prices decreased mining activity.283 The company then 
engaged in other sustained actions to improve the community, and, 
according to the scholars evaluating the project, stakeholders began 
to see the company as credible again.284  
 
A change in mine management, however, again depleted the 
developing social license. The new management had no knowledge 
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of the history and commitments between the company and the 
communities.285 Top management at the new company stopped 
meeting with community members.286 Then, commitments on 
employment and training fell through.287 Indeed, despite the  fact 
that the communities had almost full employment, the company’s 
credibility was lost, and later the company again had to invest years 
in rebuilding it.288 
 
What happened? The company had set out to develop a relationship, 
but at various points it either lost interest or focus. It failed to follow 
through on its commitments, which is crucial to the believability 
standard. Eventually, the company realized that its approach was 
threatening the existence and profitability of the mine and it worked 
to resolve the issues and reestablish its social license.289 It reiterated 
its commitments and established a community-based program to 
assess and comply with all of the prior commitments.290 Then, as the 
projects came to fruition over time, the community again began to 
see the company as credible.291 Here, understanding social license 
and its bilateral nature might have resulted in earlier and sustained 
traction for the business within the community. 
 
C. Trust. 
 
The final level of social license is trust, which is a strong, durable  
form of credibility.292 Like credibility, trust is cumulative and requires 
an entity to have already achieved both legitimacy and credibility.293 
At the trust stage, the entity moves from acceptance and approval to 
a state where the stakeholders personally identify with the entity.294 
Here, the stakeholders have confidence that the entity’s decisions 
will at least be neutral, if not always in the community’s best 
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interests.295 This stage can be described as akin to psychological 
identification, in which the company and the community perceive 
their interests to be aligned.296 
 
When trust is attained, stakeholders may see their future as tied to 
that of the entity, with responsibility for the accompanying benefits 
and burdens.297 As a result, trust can carry a set of risks. A community 
that closely identifies or comes to depend on an entity is at risk if that 
entity decides to withdraw.298 The withdrawing entity is also at risk. 
Boycotts, demonstrations, or even violence on the part of 
community stakeholders can result when trust is violated.299 Thus, 
arguably, trust may be the component of social license that has the 
least traction – at least for some companies. 
 
Nevertheless, as Gap’s attempts to address human rights issues 
arising out of labor issues in its supply chain reveals, trust can 
produce real benefits for a company that has achieved it. After facing 
considerable pressure over child and bonded labor, and other human 
rights issues, Gap worked to build relationships with various 
stakeholders.300 Over a period of years, it developed a set of 
principles that it documented in a Social Responsibility Report.301 This 
report was notable at the time because it admitted to prior issues, 
thus providing transparency, and also stated an ongoing commitment 
to improving factory conditions.302 
 
Gap continues to produce this report today and has engaged NGOs 
and others in its monitoring efforts, thus increasing its believability 
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among such groups.303 In addition, the company has committed itself 
to “forging sustainable solutions” and “creating lasting change.”304 
 
Some of the key factors it developed to achieve those goals are the 
types of factors any company, or board, might consider, including 
inspecting, monitoring, and measuring; integrating compliance into 
business practices; collaborating with external stakeholders to 
address the systemic and cultural issues contributing to the human 
rights challenges; and communicating transparently with 
stakeholders.305 
 
The establishment of, and adherence to, these principles was 
significant for the company, in part because many of the issues 
contributing to the human rights problems were outside of its 
control.306 The principles and adherence to them was part of building 
credibility. Trust was more complicated, but once the company 
established its credibility and commitment to long-term resolution of 
the issues, it earned trust even among stakeholders who had recently 
boycotted it.307 In fact, this trust relationship was crucial when, 
several years later, information surfaced that one of the company’s 
suppliers in India was using bonded labor.308 This time, stakeholders 
who had previously opposed Gap rose to its defense.309 The Ethical 
Trading Initiative’s actions in defense of Gap are an example of trust 
in the company’s commitment to preventing human rights violations 
and reveals a strong level of identification between the company and 
the stakeholder.310 
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It is important to note, however, that not all company/stakeholder 
relationships require the full legitimacy-credibility-trust process of 
social license.311 Depending on the nature of the industry and its 
expected longevity in the community, some companies may 
cooperate effectively with stakeholders by developing only 
legitimacy.312 Indeed, for low-commitment, fluid transactions, 
legitimacy may be all that is necessary.313 As social capital in the 
relationship, and the company’s stake in a project or strategy grows, 
however, credibility and trust become more important to the 
company and the overall success of the project.314 
 
All three of these case studies exhibit social license in operation.  
They reveal how a board might deploy the social license theory in its 
strategy and as a for risk management. Of course this theory, like 
many others is not a panacea. Nevertheless, the case studies 
explored here reveal companies worked to achieve social license 
because it is both profitable and powerful.315 These case studies also 
reveal that social license is not just about public relations campaigns, 
which are one-sided in nature. Instead, enacting the social-license 
theory requires sustained engagement with multiple parties, 
believable and fulfilled commitments, strong transparency, ongoing 
communication, and relationship building. 
 
IV. Wells Fargo, Uber, and Social License. 
 
As the case studies in Part III reveal, the social license framework – 
legitimacy, credibility, and trust, along with their corollaries of 
acceptance, approval, and identity– is a powerful tool for the 
forward-thinking on the part of an organization that Fink suggested in 
his letter to CEOs.316 This realm, of course, is the space in which 
boards perform some of their most important functions. Yet, as the 
Wells Fargo and Uber examples detail, the process of publicness can 
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engulf the board and prevent it from focusing on the long-run goals 
and strategy of the company, instead, forcing it into continual 
reaction mode.317 This section of the Article examines the scandals at 
Wells Fargo and Uber through the lens of social license theory, 
developing it as a framework for boards to engage with and oversee 
management and, thereby, to fulfill their long-term strategy and risk- 
management roles, and even their fiduciary duties, while tempering 
both the substance and process of publicness. 
 
A. Wells Fargo’s Social License. 
 
Let’s begin with Wells Fargo. Its new CEO recently stated that, to 
regain lost trust, the bank “must continue to be transparent with all 
… stakeholders and go beyond what has been asked … by 
regulators.”318 This statement is at odds with the bank’s prior vision 
of itself as a trusted community bank. Wells Fargo saw itself as a 
“community bank” that was localized and connected. To succeed, 
Wells Fargo, like all banks, must persuade people to give it their 
savings. That, in itself, requires legitimacy, credibility, and trust – the 
fundamental components of a social license. Yet, after the initial set 
of scandals was revealed, Wells Fargo was forced to close 400 branch 
banks and continues to have trouble persuading customers to build 
accounts. This situation recalls the 1929 run on the banks– a situation 
resulting from panic and fear– and an accompanying loss of 
legitimacy, credibility, and trust in the system. Although there is 
reason to believe the Wells Fargo scandal may not be repeated at 
other banks,319 it nevertheless goes to the heart of the prerequisites 
for a strong financial system: trust between consumers and their 
banks.320 
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How did Wells Fargo lose its social license? Recall that it came out of 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis with the strongest reputation and, 
seemingly, business of any of the banks.321 It appeared to be 
unsullied by the issues plaguing the other banks.322 Nevertheless, as 
it pressed forward on its cross-sell strategy, it fell victim to its own 
mythology, failing to consider the consequences of that strategy, or 
to create systems to manage the risks of its business decisions– even 
after the 2009 financial crisis. 
 
From 2010-2015, Wells Fargo’s assets grew by 46% and its net 
income grew by over 85%.323 Its stock prices also grew, making it the 
most valuable bank in the world. Community banking contributed 
more to that growth than any other division at the bank, and the 
community bank’s performance was directly connected to cross- 
selling.324 Analysts made buy recommendations based on the cross- 
selling growth. In fact, the cross-sell ratio at Wells Fargo (6.27) was 
more than twice the average for U.S. banks (2.71)- a discrepancy that 
should have provoked dialogue and inspection in the boardroom 
(and by analysts).325 Indeed, all of this information was publicly 
discussed and presumably available to the board, and yet it 
seemingly failed to provoke questions about what accounted for this 
bank’s success.326 Those deliberations, however, might well have 
created an opportunity to investigate whether the success was 
legitimate, whether management’s responses were credible and 
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informed, what the downside risks were, and how they were being 
measured and managed.327 
 
Moreover, those discussions might well have revealed that cross- 
selling did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it transpired in a world of 
incentives and coercion. There were quarterly bonuses for junior 
employees and annual bonuses for district managers.328 There were 
also quotas, which employees say were unrealistic and, when 
combined with comments from managers, resulted in pressure to 
open the fake accounts, including at least one opened for a homeless 
woman that had fees of $39.00 per month.329 This is a salient 
example in the context of legitimacy, as it becomes impossible to  
give the benefit-of-the-doubt to a bank whose employees engage in 
this sort of swindle, hustle, and outright fraud. 
 
Indeed, the actual number of unauthorized accounts remains 
unknown. The company admitted to 2.1 million such accounts in 
2016, but in July of 2017, it expanded its investigation to include 
earlier years and the number has increased.330 The bank, however, 
investigated only the years 2008-2011331 and there are indications 
that the practices go back as far as 2002.332 And, Wells’ then CEO, Tim 
Sloan, resisted pressure to look back further for more violations.333 
This set of choices, and the media churn around it, makes clear that 
neither the bank, nor apparently it board, has a handle on the depth 
of its problems. Meanwhile, the account scandal is steadily growing 
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and diminishing any remaining credibility. Indeed, Tim Sloan resigned 
in March 2019.334. 
 
Further, the process of publicness exposed additional frauds.335 Take 
for example, the car loan-repossession story-- the “latest Wells Fargo 
scandal.”336 Between 20,000 and 570,000337 customers of the bank 
were enrolled in and charged for car insurance without their 
knowledge, and when some of them failed to make payments on the 
unknown insurance, they had their cars repossessed as a result.338 
This is a new, but likely, cross-sell connected. Even though Wells 
Fargo has said it is “extremely sorry” and promised to refund 
customers and work with credit bureaus to make it right, it lacks 
credibility at this stage.339 After all, credibility requires believability, 
but each new scandal forces the bank to deploy a new investigation 
and publicly admit to new problems, thereby, further diminishing its 
credibility. 
 
In fact, the problems at Wells Fargo that contributed to the loss of its 
social license seem to have been endemic. As the New York City 
Comptroller Scott Stringer said in response to the auto-loan 
revelations, “This is a full-blown scandal -- again. It's unbelievable, 
outrageous, sad, and yet quintessential Wells Fargo.”340 This 
comment reflects on the internal workings of the bank that created 
the issues, and it reveals the ongoing devolution of its social license 
with which the board must now contend. The process of publicness 
contributed to the bank losing its social license, but Wells Fargo also 
lost its social license because its rhetoric, ethics, and sales policies did 
not correlate with its incentives. Sales manuals required signatures 
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and consent for all “solutions” or services, but the incentives and 
pressure produced the opposite. The picture simply did not match 
the soundtrack. 
 
Moreover, employees who pushed back suffered retaliation, 
including harassment and firings.341 Consider this headline: “I called 
the Wells Fargo ethics line and was fired.”342 These types of 
allegations go back for quite a few years, to long before the scandal 
was “discovered.” Indeed, there is evidence of employees raising 
issues through established bank procedures and then being 
terminated.343 Thus, in addition to revealing that employee 
stakeholders do not trust the bank, the scandals reveal something 
more troubling: a company culture focused on growth at the expense 
its customers, its employees, and the stability of the banking system. 
In short, the series of scandals “undermines confidence, which is the 
most important asset of [the] bank.”344 
 
Recall that a perception of fairness is central to establishing 
legitimacy. According to the academics who studied the Georgia 
pipeline, BP worked to build legitimacy by expending resources 
engaging with and investing in the communities where it wanted “to 
do business.” It hired local workers and engaged stakeholders. In 
contrast, Wells Fargo undermined its legitimacy by treating its 
workers unfairly. Indeed, when the fake accounts scandal began to 
surface, the bank used its employees as scapegoats, blaming and 
firing them rather than owning up to and taking responsibility for the 
sales culture the leadership created. 
 
Furthermore, Wells, like Sumitomo in the San Cristobal mine 
situation, lacks a coherent and consistent set of actions to build its 
credibility. The leadership involved in the San Cristobal mine went 
through several changes, and the company’s interest in the mine 
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varied with mineral prices. The company’s failure to follow through 
on commitments lead to disbelief in its statements and promises. 
Then, when mineral prices increased, the company lacked the 
support it needed and was forced to increase its local expenditures in 
order to rebuild its social license and, thereby, build its business. 
 
Despite the fact that Wells Fargo was not planning to go out of 
business or even to put growth on hold, it now faces a situation 
similar to Sumitomo’s. The unrelenting process of publicness and the 
years of inattention by the board and management has resulted in a 
company that is unable to gain its footing. Here is where engaging in 
and thinking about social license might have aided the board.  
Boards, of course, pay attention to company financials and hear 
regular reports about growth and challenges.345 As noted above, 
most of the growth was coming from the Community Bank. Indeed, 
the “solutions practice” was key to the bank’s growth strategy, with 
cross-sell numbers significantly above those of other banks – yet no 
one noticed. Ironically, the premise of building those consumer 
relations was to make consumers sticky, a long-run strategy requiring 
at least the legitimacy and credibility that is now undercut by the 
frauds. 
 
Moreover, although the board’s role is not to implement strategy, it 
is charged with overseeing strategy development and setting pillars 
against which management can execute. The board’s role is to ask 
questions and question answers to provide effective challenges to 
management’s thinking. The questions appear to have been missing 
here. A focus on legitimacy, credibility, and trust, with discussions 
about what was underpinning the remarkable 18-year growth in 
cross-sales, might have led to discovery of the faulty execution of the 
strategy. In short, situations where the numbers are “too good to be 
true” are just the type of situations on which boards, fulfilling their 
fiduciary duties, watching out for sustained and systemic problems, 
and acting with social license in mind, should focus.346 
                                                 
345 The corporate governance scheme assigns the role of monitoring management to the 
directors. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2014). 
346 The board’s lapses are also revealed in the way in which the risk committee developed. The 
board was slow to put one in place. Then, even once it was in existence, it was plagued by 
misrepresentations from the management. Committee members raised concerns but did not 
push back on Stumpf, thus failing to assert themselves in the interests of credibility and trust. 
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The bank also squandered the trust it appeared to have achieved 
after successfully navigating the recent financial crisis. Recall the Gap 
case study from Part III. Gap built trust by admitting its complicity in 
human rights and labor violations, stating an ongoing commitment to 
reforming its labor practices, and then following through by 
increasing transparency and monitoring. Initially, it seemed that 
Wells might adopt this example by issuing a report of its own, 
outlining its failures in managing the cross-sell approach. However, 
the slew of scandals that have come to light after the issuance of that 
report, and the bank’s reluctance to investigate reports of pre-2008 
cross-selling, indicates that Wells may have been focused on 
accepting responsibility only for those scandals that had already been 
revealed -- rather than executing on a more comprehensive approach 
to reform and compliance. 
 
Here is where attention to social license might have been beneficial. 
If the Wells Fargo board had been operationalizing social license from 
the beginning, initial questions would have focused on legitimacy. 
Post-financial crisis, all banks are subject to scrutiny and are targets 
for the media and the process of publicness. Indeed, it is fair to say 
that the industry as a whole is not in the zone of “benefit of the 
doubt.” Thus, management reports on strategy execution could have 
been followed by with questions about the potential pitfalls and 
challenges, and how those, in turn, might impact an already shaky 
position of legitimacy among stakeholders.347 
 
Similarly, the board should inquire as to the incentive effects 
imbedded in strategy execution choices. These are the exact 
questions that, when executing on its oversight responsibility (and 
fulfilling its fiduciary duty of loyalty/good faith),348 a board should 
pursue. Indeed, the oversight role requires the board to posit 
                                                                                                                                                    
HOLDER, supra note 170. These types of situation can also be indicative of accounting fraud, like at 
Worldcom, and require the board’s attention. 
347 A discussion of this sort might also have revealed that the Wells, community-based 
strategy had a shelf life in the era of mobile banking. It is now clear that other banks began 
closing their branches far earlier than Wells, but the unrelenting focus on cross-sells, 
propped up by fake accounts, appears to have prevented the board (and perhaps 
management) from focusing on the next era in banking. Egan, supra note 325. 
348 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del 2006) (describing the fiduciary duty of good faith as 
a subset of the duty of loyalty). 
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whether incentives might lead to unethical and illegal behavior. 
Incentives gone wrong, as in the Wells Fargo example, can have a 
dramatic impact on credibility. Indeed, when employees are creating 
fake accounts for customers or adding unauthorized auto insurance 
to car loans, the bank is risking its legitimacy, credibility, and trust. 
 
Moreover, engagement of this sort could have assisted the board in 
monitoring the company’s strategy execution and fulfilling its risk 
management role. Boards engage in risk management in multiple 
ways. For example, audit committees receive reports from 
whistleblower hotlines on a regular basis, including reports of 
allegations like those at Wells Fargo or, for example, safety violations 
at manufacturing or mining companies. Boards also receive reports 
tracking changes in levels of internal and external complaints, as well 
as risky investments. In addition, Human Resources may provide 
updates about terminations or significant personnel issues. This sort 
of information is key to risk management and in the zone of board 
oversight. The failure to attend to it over time results in failures, 
publicness, and the loss of social license. 
 
Although it is unclear whether the Wells Fargo board received any of 
this sort of information, ex post investigations reveal that the 
information the board did receive was fragmented, because of the 
company’s decentralized nature and, perhaps, due to management 
evasion. Information holes certainly contributed to the sustained 
nature of the account and other cross-sell problems, and to the 
fraud. Yet, if the board had pressed with questions about strategy 
and its downside risks, it would have ensured dialogue about the 
types of underlying facts necessary to develop legitimacy, credibility, 
and trust and thus helped to protect the company’s social license.349 
This type of engagement is also consistent with the board’s fiduciary 
duty of loyalty/good faith, and with its role in ensuring that 
                                                 
349 In this sense, a focus on social license correlates with the information-forcing-substance 
theory that I and others have developed for the role that the federal securities laws play in 
the fiduciary duty space. See, e.g., Sale & Langevoort, supra note 38; Sale, supra note 19; 
Sale & Thompson, supra note 14; Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities 
Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 1380 (2006). 
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management is on track with respect to understanding and vetting 
risks to the company.350 
 
B. Uber’s Social License. 
 
In the beginning, Uber appears to have met the sort of low level, 
benefit-of-the-doubt standard required for legitimacy. It provided 
rides for less than taxis – and with greater reliability. It found a niche 
in a market that was perceived as overpriced. The demand for 
transportation of this sort was quite large, and Uber capitalized on it. 
Moreover, the center of its business– the app– worked. Drivers 
showed up as promised and most rides were uneventful, which 
helped Uber move from legitimacy to credibility among its customer 
base. Indeed, that is how it won supporters and stakeholders and 
attracted repeated rounds of funding. 
 
Yet, Uber’s business model was premised on not applying for legal 
licenses. It treated government regulators as “an impediment, not an 
entity to partner with or seek approval from.”351 Termed “regulatory 
entrepreneurship,” by some academics,352 Uber’s rhetoric focused on 
its aspirations to change the laws and regulations. Its behavior, 
however, seems to have gone well beyond simply eluding regulation 
through “ride-sharing,” instead creating a pervasive sexual 
harassment culture inside the company and building a business 
model premised on law breaking and lawlessness. 
 
Name the stakeholder, and Uber appears to have had an argument 
with it. Its insistence on law breaking has resulted in high billables for 
its lawyers, but has also engendered a series of “high-profile spats 
and setbacks.”353 The company has had a succession  of  disputes 
                                                 
350 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (developing 
board’s risk oversight role); Stone, 911 A.2d at 362; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del.  2009). See also 
Sale, supra note 356; Sale & Langevoort, supra note 38; Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank 
Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrated Enforcement, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1011, 1016-18 
(2017). 
351 Lev-Ram, supra note 208.  
352 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
383 (2017). This is a term that puts a very generous gloss on what was, in effect, operating 
outside the rule of law. 
353 Lev-Ram, supra note 208.  
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with city governments, taxi drivers, and even with its own 
workers.”354 It built software systems to evade law enforcement and 
to lobby regulators and legislatures, creating a sandwich of evasion 
and protection. On the protection side, Uber took advantage of the 
fact that the regulatory environment was largely local in nature, 
allowing for a divide and conquer approach – that, as one city after 
another caved under the pressure, made Uber’s lawbreaking seem 
normal and even positive.355 
 
Of course, the patterns and culture have become transparent only in 
the wake of a series of scandals exposed through the process of 
publicness, thus allowing Uber to grow until the publicness occurred. 
Moreover, two key stakeholders, investors and riders, were “sticking 
with” Uber, and those stakeholders were the ones that provided the 
money. Yet, as discussed in Part II, Uber can no longer count on 
them. And, without them, Uber would have nothing – no business 
license and no social license. 
 
Uber’s loss of its social license did not occur for want of opportunity 
to develop it. Like BP, Uber could have built strong legitimacy by 
employing local workers and investing in the communities where it 
was developing its service. In contrast to BP, which established a 
dialogue with and worked to treat local workers fairly and invested in 
the communities,356 Uber mistreated its workers and disregarded 
community regulations and norms. Uber lied to employees by telling 
them they could not legally work both for Lyft and Uber;357 its CEO 
verbally abused a driver (at least once);358 it operated without legal 
license;359 it disregarded and displaced local taxi drivers;360 and it 
charged surge prices during crises and disasters.361 In short, Uber 
chose to reject the power of legitimacy. 
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It similarly failed to take advantage of opportunities to build 
credibility or trust, instead meeting community concerns with 
hostility and displaying an inability to reform its corporate culture of 
aggression, harassment, and exploitation. Recall how Sumitomo 
worked to rebuild its credibility by ensuring that it followed through 
on its commitments to the community. Uber, on the other hand, 
committed to addressing the pervasive culture of sexual harassment 
within the company, and then continued to engage in conduct that 
exacerbated rather than ameliorated that problem. Trust requires 
that stakeholders have confidence that actions will be (at least) 
neutral. The process of publicness, however, has revealed that Uber 
was unconcerned with developing its relationships with its 
stakeholders and that its statements are not believable. 
 
The series of scandals is eroding its social license in other ways as 
well. Lyft is attracting a larger and larger share of the market and 
signing contracts with Waymo and General Motors. Whether 
customers will continue to leave Uber remains to be seen, but the 
indicators are that it is happening. The unrelenting negative process 
of publicness has taken a toll. From delete-the-app boycotts to 
companies choosing not to reimburse employees for Uber rides, 
Uber’s business is under challenge – primarily because the company 
lost the trust of its stakeholders. Its investors know this and are 
concerned, both because Uber is overvalued and because it is not 
profitable and has a very high burn rate, which means that new and 
repeated capital infusions are required to keep it afloat.362 
 
Like Sumitomo in the San Cristobal mine case, Uber must reassure 
not just its investors, but also its stakeholders. The board’s recent 
actions convey that it is aware of this need. It has taken steps to 
stabilize the company and rebuild trust with its stakeholders: two of 
its venture capitalists left the board; searches for independent 
directors are underway; the board adopted the Holder Report, 
elevating the status of the board with respect to management and 
                                                 
362 Blair Hanley Frank, Uber Investors Reportedly Push CEO Travis Kalanick out of Company, 
VENTUREBEAT (June 20, 2017 10:51 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/06/20/uber-
investors- reportedly-push-ceo-travis-kalanick-out-of-company/. 
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resulting in Kalanick’s resignation;363 personnel policies are under 
revision; and a new CEO has been chosen. All of these are steps to 
save the company and prevent its market share from continuing to 
slip. They are also taking steps toward reestablishing aspects of the 
company’s social license by treating publicness as part of the cost 
benefit rubric. 
 
Like the Gap, Uber has begun to increase its transparency. It is 
releasing information to the public even when not legally required, 
revealing an understanding that attention to legitimacy through 
transparency is key to its recovery and to sustaining relationships. 
The board must now develop a consistent expectation that 
management will provide information and develop internal processes 
to ensure that the company’s strategy does not negatively impact 
efforts to rebuild the company’s social license. The Holder Report is, 
of course, not binding in a legal sense, but what Uber learned the 
hard way is that it is tied to Uber’s legitimacy, credibility, and trust. 
As the San Cristobal mining case study made clear, credibility 
requires transparency, consistency, and honesty. The board must 
now model those traits. The business model and level of 
deterioration and distraction inside the company, however, may 
mean that the process to rebuild will be protracted.364 Reestablishing 
social license will require implementing compliance, oversight, and 
risk-management systems that result in transparent, legitimate, and 
credible behaviors. Paying attention to those issues will help to 
rebuild Uber and is a powerful way to manage both the substance 
and process of publicness.365 
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 Conclusion. 
 
The BlackRock letter makes clear that shareholders understand that 
long-term corporate success requires boards to pursue governance 
models that anticipate and respond to stakeholder concerns. This 
article posits that social license theory is a powerful tool that boards 
can employ to manage those concerns. To this end, the article 
develops the social license theory in the context of both publicness 
and the board of directors and its role in overseeing strategy and risk 
management. The social license theory adds to the discussions in the 
literature about reputational capital and other theories and provides 
an additional tool for corporate governance scholars to leverage in 
analyzing fiduciary duties (and governance gaps), as well as the 
effects of publicness that ensue when risk management fails. Indeed, 
social license has at its core concepts of sustainability and 
relationship building; it is about value creation, long term focus, and 
sustained and systematic governance. As the examples in Part III 
reveal, companies from the mining industries to Gap have used social 
license to build and maintain their businesses and company 
reputations – revealing the power of the theory in action. 
 
Social license in the hands of the board may also empower 
compliance and other risk management personnel.366 What we know 
from the research is that systematic inspections and programs are 
likely more effective than programs based on incentives and 
penalties, because the latter tend to undermine individual 
motivations to comply.367 In addition, self-regulatory structures 
perform well only when third-party monitoring exists.368 Thus, having 
a board that is engaged in and thinking about the company’s 
legitimacy, credibility, and trust will support compliance and risk 
management more generally and, thereby, help to ensure strategy 
execution and the board’s fulfillment of its fiduciary duties. 
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In sum, as the Wells Fargo and Uber case studies reveal, social license 
theory can be conceptualized as a tool for boards and a framework 
for engaging in the fiduciary duty of oversight and risk management. 
Strategy execution is not risk free, and the failure to project and 
consider risks in both companies was a board failure. Of course, risks 
and profits are correlated, but so are risks and publicness. The role of 
directors is to hold management accountable for engaging in actual 
risk management and to ensure that systems are in place to catch 
and manage risks. Thus, whether the problems are fraud and 
cheating, as at Wells Fargo, or sexual harassment and law breaking, 
as at Uber, the board’s role is to develop sustained and systematic 
risk management programs and to be sufficiently engaged in 
monitoring corporate decision-making to ensure that that strategy 
and profit-seeking are balanced with the stakeholder concerns that 
publicness makes apparent. Here is where social license theory can 
play a role – it provides boards with a framework for executing their 
fiduciary duties, engaging in a forward-thinking cost benefit analysis, 
and weighing choices for legitimacy, credibility, and trust, with 
systems in place to build transparency and accountability. In this 
manner, social license can also help to protect companies from the 
process of publicness and thereby avoid the inevitable outcome of 
that process – additional substantive publicness. 
